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Viewing cable 07BERN259, IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL'S BRIEFS ON HIS MOST \

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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 07BERN259 | 2007-03-16 12:23 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bern |

Appears in these articles:

http://www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers

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VZCZCXRO7543
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHSW #0259/01 0751223
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161223Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3817
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

2007-03-16 12:23:00 07BERN259 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN258 VZCZCXRO7543\
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DE RUEHSW #0259/01 0751223\
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 \
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL'S BRIEFS ON HIS MOST \
RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN AND REQUESTS MEETING IN WASHINGTON \
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REF: BERN 258 \
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Summary \

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1.(C) Just back from three days in Tehran, Swiss DFA State \

Secretary Michael Ambuehl on March 16 briefed Ambassador \

SIPDIS \

Coneway on his meetings with Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali \

Larijani and asked for Embassy support for a meeting in \

Washington with U/S Burns and/or other senior Department \

officials next week (week of March 19). Ambuehl described \

the senior Iranian officials as "feeling cornered, but \

remaining intransigent" on the suspension of enrichment. \

Nonetheless, Ambuehl believes there is hope the Iranians will \

agree to talk. While Ambuehl made it clear that he had "no \

scoop" for us (his words), Embassy Bern believes a \

senior-level briefing in Washington would offer an \

opportunity to gain Ambuehl's insights and provide the \

Department an opportunity to reinforce the USG position on \

Iran with the Swiss. End Summary. \

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"No Scoop" \

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2.(C) As he had previewed to EUR Assistant Secretary Fried on \

March 9 (reftel), Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs \

Michael Ambuehl, with DFA Near East/Africa chief Livia Leu, \

traveled to Tehran March 12-15 to underscore to Iranian \

officials the need to abide by the UN Security Council and \

IAEA demands. Ambuehl advised that IAEA DG ElBaradei had \

encouraged him to make the trip. In a March 16 briefing for \

the Ambassador, DCM, and Poloff, Ambuehl said that he had met \

twice with Nuclear Negotiator Larijani and his deputy Sayyed \

Ali Monfared, again separately with Monfared, and with Deputy \

Foreign Minister Jalili (whom Ambuehl described as seemingly \

out of the nuclear picture now). \

3.(C) Ambuehl said he had reiterated his previous message to \

Larijani that Iran must comply with UN Security Council \

Resolution 1737, or face further sanctions. Larijani's \

reaction, Ambuehl said, was "irritation with the Swiss \

insistence." Ambuehl said Larijani was similarly irritated \

following telephone calls from Swiss Foreign Minister \

Calmy-Rey and (Ambuehl understands) German Foreign Minister \

Steinmeier. Ambuehl assured us he had made clear to Larijani \

that the visit was a Swiss initiative, with backing from the \

IAEA. Ambuehl shared with the Ambassador a paper he had \

passed to the Iranians describing the Swiss proposal (para \

7). According to Ambuehl, Larijani said Iran could accept \

all points in the paper, except the most important point -- \

suspension of all enrichment-related activities. \

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Briefing Washington \

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4.(C) Notwithstanding Iran's intransigence on the enrichment \

issue, Ambuehl said that the "hours" of meetings yielded some \

interesting insights. He said he hoped to brief Washington \

as soon as possible -- as early as Monday, March 19 -- if \

Under Secretary Burns and/or other appropriate senior \

officials would be available. The Ambassador asked Ambuehl \

if he had heard anything from Iran that he hadn't heard \

before. Ambuehl replied that he had no actionable \

recommendations for the USG, but thought his readout would be \

of value to the Department. He could not say he was \

encouraged, neither was he discouraged, but felt it would be \

worthwhile "to reflect to the US in exact terms" what the \

Iranians said. The Ambassador thanked Ambuehl for both the \

preview of the visit to A/S Fried and the briefing \

immediately after. He agreed to convey Ambuehl's request to \

the Department and get back to him. \

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Comment \

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5.(C) Given ElBaradei's putative role in the Ambuehl visit to \

Tehran, we gather that the Swiss initiative echoes \ ElBaradei's views, and may have been previously conveyed to \ Tehran by ElBaradei. While Swiss side efforts give us cause \ for concern, the fact that Larijani appears to have rebuffed \ the Swiss could be helpful in convincing fence straddlers in \ the international community that the Iranians are \ intransigent. \

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¶6. Embassy Bern believes it would be constructive for \ Department officials to receive State Secretary Ambuehl the \ week of March 19. Ambuehl made it clear that he (and one or \ two others) would travel any time and would ask for no more \ than an hour. The meeting could allow Ambuehl to share in \ greater depth the Iranian reaction to the Swiss proposal and \ provide the Department an opportunity to reinforce the USG \ position on Iran with the Swiss. End comment. \

----- \ Text of Swiss Paper \

7.(SBU) Following is the text of the Swiss non-paper passed \ to Larijani: \

Guiding Principles and Mechanism to Relaunch the Negotiations \

Step 1: Informal Talks \

The parties will hold informal talks in order to agree on the \ following guiding principles which will serve as a basis to \ relaunch negotiations: \

¶1. In order to create the necessary confidence: \

-- Iran will suspend all its enrichment-related activities as \ required by the UNSC and the IAEA and to be verified by the \ latter; \

-- The P5 plus 1 will simultaneously suspend the \ implementation of the UNSC sanctions and will ensure that the \ Iranian nuclear issue will not be considered by the UNSC, but \ that the file will be returned to the IAEA. \

The parties will agree on the date of the entry into force of \ this double suspension, which will last until the end of \ negotiations in step 2, but no longer than six months unless \ otherwise agreed. \

¶2. Iran will adopt a policy of maximum transparency in its \ cooperation with the IAEA. To this end, Iran will present a \ timetable to the IAEA with a view to resolving all remaining \ outstanding issues. \

¶3. The P5 plus 1 recognize and affirm Iran's right to \ peaceful use of nuclear energy under Article IV of the NPT \ and in accordance with Articles II and III of the NPT. The \ modalities ensuring Iran's access to nuclear energy for \ peaceful purposes, as well as the timing and modalities of \ the exercise of certain aspects of this right, namely the \ sensitive part of the fuel cycle, will be agreed in the \ negotiations under step 2, in conjunction with the \ confidence-building measures that need to be undertaken in \ Iran. \

Step 2: Negotiations \

As soon as the commitments regarding the double suspension \ and the time-table are implemented, step 2 begins. \

The parties will enter into negotiations in good faith with \ the aim of achieving a comprehensive settlement ("package") \ including nuclear issues and non-nuclear areas, such as \ economic cooperation, international security, and political \ dialogue, with a view to streamlining and strengthening \ cooperation between the P5 plus 1 and Iran. \

The three guiding principles and the mechanism for \ relaunching the negotiations will be incorporated in a joint \

declaration signed by the P5 plus 1 and Iran. \
\
End text of Swiss paper. \
CONEWAY \